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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
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FARON RAYMOND HAWKINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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)
)
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)
)

NO. 44974
Ada County Case No.
CR-FE-2007-5

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Faron Raymond Hawkins appeals, pro se, from the district court’s order denying his
I.C.R. 35 motion for correction of an illegal sentence.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In 2008, a jury found Hawkins guilty of two counts of robbery. State v. Hawkins, 159
Idaho 507, 509, 363 P.3d 348, 350 (2015). The district court entered a judgment of conviction
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and imposed concurrent unified sentences of life, with 30 years fixed. State v. Hawkins, 148
Idaho 774, 777, 229 P.3d 379, 382 (Ct. App. 2009). On appeal from his convictions, Hawkins
argued the district court erred by not sua sponte ordering a competency evaluation. Id. The
Court of Appeals agreed and vacated the judgment and remanded for a determination of
Hawkins’ competency. Id. at 777-783, 229 P.3d at 382-388.
On remand, the district court conducted the required competency proceedings and found
that Hawkins was competent, both at the time of the competency proceedings and when he stood
trial in January 2008. State v. Hawkins, 155 Idaho 69, 70-71, 305 P.3d 513, 514-515 (2013).
However, because the concluding paragraph of the Court of Appeals’ opinion stated it was “not
possible to retroactively make a determination as to Hawkins’ competency at the time he was
tried,” the district court concluded it was bound by “law of the case” to conduct a new trial. Id.
at 71, 305 P.3d at 515. The Idaho Supreme Court granted the state’s request for leave to file a
permissive appeal as to this latter determination, id., and ultimately held that “[n]either the law of
the case doctrine nor I.A.R. 38 prevents the district court from making a retroactive competency
determination as to Hawkins in this case,” id. at 75, 305 P.3d at 519.
On remand following the Idaho Supreme Court’s opinion, and following additional
proceedings intended to ensure Hawkins’ competency, the district court reinstated the judgment
and the concurrent unified sentences of life, with 30 years fixed. State v. Hawkins, 159 Idaho
507, 509-512, 363 P.3d 348, 350-353 (2015). The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the judgment
and sentences in an opinion issued on December 22, 2015. Id. at 512-517, 363 P.3d at 353-358.
On January 12, 2017, Hawkins filed a pro se Rule 35 motion for correction of an illegal
sentence. (R., pp.66-68; see also pp.69-83 (attachments).) He filed a second pro se Rule 35
motion for correction of an illegal sentence and a motion for the appointment of counsel on
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March 13, 2017. (R., pp.91-99, 105-207.) The district court entered an “Order Denying Motion
For Correction Or Reduction Of Sentence” on March 23, 2017 (R., pp.208-09), from which
Hawkins timely appealed (R., p.210).
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ISSUE
Hawkins’ issue statement is set forth at pages 1-5 of his Appellant’s Brief 1 and, due to its
length, is not reproduced here.
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as follows:
Has Hawkins failed to show the district court erred in denying his Rule 35 motion for
correction of an illegal sentence?

1

For ease of reference, the state has numbered the pages of the Appellant’s Brief (excluding the
cover page) in consecutive, numerical order.
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ARGUMENT
Hawkins Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His Rule 35 Motion For
Correction Of An Illegal Sentence
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Hawkins’ Rule 35 motion for correction of an illegal sentence

and, in so doing, necessarily concluded that the concurrent unified sentences of life, with 30
years fixed, imposed upon Hawkins’ robbery convictions do not exceed the maximum sentence
prescribed by statute and are not otherwise contrary to applicable law. (R., pp.208-09.) In his
Appellant’s Brief, Hawkins sets forth a laundry list of issues and arguments he wishes this Court
to address on appeal. (See generally Appellant’s brief.)

Although Hawkins appears to have

raised most of these issues and arguments in conjunction with his Rule 35 motions below, none
of his arguments show his sentence is illegal or that the district court erred in denying his Rule 35
motion.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a sentence is illegal is question law, given free review. State v. Adamcik, 152

Idaho 445, 485, 272 P.3d 417, 457 (2012).

C.

Hawkins Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His Rule 35 Motion
Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) is a narrow rule that allows a trial court to correct an illegal

sentence at any time. State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84, 218 P.3d 1143, 1145 (2009). In
Clements, the Idaho Supreme Court held that “the interpretation of ‘illegal sentence’ under Rule
35 is limited to sentences that are illegal from the face of the record, i.e., those sentences that do
not involve significant questions of fact nor an evidentiary hearing to determine their illegality.”
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Id. at 87, 218 P.3d at 1148. An illegal sentence under Rule 35 is one in excess of a statutory
provision or otherwise contrary to applicable law. State v. Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733, 745, 69 P.3d
153, 165 (Ct. App. 2003).
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 cannot be used as the procedural mechanism to attack the validity
of the underlying conviction. State v. McDonald, 130 Idaho 963, 965, 950 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Ct.
App. 1997). “[U]nder Rule 35, a trial court cannot examine the underlying facts of a crime to
which a defendant pled guilty to determine if the sentence is illegal.” State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho
55, 65, 343 P.3d 497, 507 (2015) (citations omitted). “Moreover, Rule 35’s purpose is to allow
courts to correct illegal sentences, not to reexamine errors occurring at trial or before the
imposition of the sentence.” Id. (emphasis original).
The jury found Hawkins guilty of two counts of robbery, a crime that carries a statutory
maximum sentence of life imprisonment.

See I.C. § 18-6503 (“Robbery is punishable by

imprisonment in the state prison not less than five (5) years, and the imprisonment may be
extended to life.”). The district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of life, with 30 years
fixed. (41621 R., pp.280-84. 2) Because the sentences imposed are on their face not in excess of
the statutorily mandated maximum sentence for robbery, the sentences are not illegal. See
Clements, 148 Idaho at 84, 218 P.3d at 1145; Alsanea, 138 Idaho at 745, 69 P.3d at 165. The
district court thus correctly denied Hawkins Rule 35 motion.
Hawkins challenges the denial of his Rule 35 motion on several bases. First, he argues
the trial court violated his due process rights by making a retroactive competency determination
and then “sentenc[ing] and reconvict[ing]” him “without trial or plea” and “without 14 days[’]
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The Idaho Supreme Court entered an order augmenting the appellate record in this case with the
clerk’s record and transcripts filed in Hawkins’ prior appeal, No. 41621. (R., p.2.)
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notice required by state law.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8.) Hawkins’ due process arguments do
not afford him any basis for relief from the denial of his Rule 35 motion for several reasons.
First, Hawkins’ claim that the district court erred by making a retroactive competency
determination is a challenge to his underlying conviction, not a challenge to the legality of his
sentence, and is therefore not within the scope of an I.C.R. 35(a) motion. E.g., McDonald, 130
Idaho at 965, 950 P.2d at 1304.
Second, even Rule 35 were a proper vehicle to challenge the trial court’s retroactive
competency determination, the Idaho Supreme Court has already addressed, and affirmed, the
trial court’s retroactive competency determination in connection with Hawkins’ direct appeal
from the amended judgment of conviction, see State v. Hawkins, 159 Idaho 507, 363 P.3d 348
(2015) (holding trial court did not err either in retroactively determining Hawkins was competent
to stand trial in 2008, or in permitting Hawkins to represent himself during competency
proceedings); as such, the issue is barred by res judicata, see State v. Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862,
863, 11 P.3d 481, 482 (2000) (doctrine of res judicata prevents re-litigation of issues that have
been previously decided in a final judgment or decision in an action between the same litigants).
Finally, even assuming Hawkins was entitled to 14 days’ notice before the court
resentenced him, Hawkins’ claim that the court failed to provide him such notice is not a claim
that his sentence is illegal, but is instead a claim that the sentence was imposed in an illegal
manner. Pursuant to Rule 35, any motion to challenge a sentence “imposed in an illegal manner”
must be brought within 120 days “after the filing of a judgment of conviction.” I.C.R. 35(b).
Because Hawkins waited more than three years after the entry of the amended judgment to bring
his claim challenging the manner in which his sentence was imposed (compare 41621 R., p.280
(Amended Judgment of Conviction filed October 24, 2013) with R., p.66 (Rule 35 motion filed
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January 12, 2017) and R., p.91 (Rule 35 motion filed March 13, 2017)), the district court was
without jurisdiction to consider it. See, e.g., State v. Sutton, 113 Idaho 832, 748 P.2d 416 (Ct.
App. 1987) (filing limits of Rule 35 are jurisdictional); State v. Salsgiver, 112 Idaho 933, 736
P.2d 1387 (Ct. App. 1987) (same).
Hawkins next argues his sentence is illegal because the state failed at the grand jury
proceedings to “perform a duty ‘expressly required’ by” former Idaho Criminal Rule 6.2(d). 3
(Appellant’s brief, pp.8-9.) Specifically, he contends the prosecutor failed to “‘Advise the Grand
Jury as to the standard of probable cause.’” (Id. (capitalization original).) Hawkins has failed to
show any entitlement to Rule 35 relief because the defect he alleges, even if true, is not
jurisdictional.
It is well settled that complaints regarding defects in an indictment must be raised prior to
trial, I.C.R. 12(b)(2), and that collateral attacks on a conviction generally may not be made
through and I.C.R. 35 motion, see, e.g., Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 430 (1962); Housley
v. State, 119 Idaho 885, 889, 811 P.2d 495, 499 (Ct. App. 1991). An exception exists for defects
that appear on the face of the record to show that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 64-66, 343 P.3d 497, 506-08 (2015). There are, however, very
limited circumstances in which defects in a charging document are jurisdictional. As explained
by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Olin, 153 Idaho 891, 893, 292 P.3d 282, 284 (Ct. App.
2012), such circumstances include:
(1) the alleged facts are not made criminal by statute; (2) there is a failure to state
facts essential to establish the offense charged; (3) the alleged facts show on their
face that the court has no jurisdiction of the charged offense; or (4) the allegations
3

Effective July 1, 2017, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted new criminal rules relating to grand
jury proceedings. The requirements of former I.C.R. 6.2(d) are now embodied in I.C.R.
6.1(b)(4).
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fail to show that the offense charged was committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.
Additionally, in cases where it appears from the face of the record that the grand jury’s term had
expired before the indictment was issued, the indictment would be void and could not confer
subject matter jurisdiction over the case. See State v. Dalling, 128 Idaho 203, 204-05, 911 P.2d
1115, 1116-17 (1996); Wolfe, 158 Idaho at 64-66, 343 P.3d at 506-08 (explaining lack of subject
matter jurisdiction must be clear from face of the record in order to obtain Rule 35 relief).
Although Hawkins argues on appeal that the prosecutor’s alleged failure to have advised
the grand jury as to the standard of probable cause, as required by former Rule 6.2(d), is a
“structural” error (see Appellant’s brief, p.9), he has failed to show the alleged error actually
deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. Hawkins does not argue that the facts
alleged in the indictment did not allege an offense that may be tried in Idaho courts. Nor does he
claim the grand jury’s term expired or was otherwise not properly constituted. Because Hawkins
has failed to identify from the record any actual jurisdictional defect in the charging document,
he has failed to show any entitlement to relief under I.C.R. 35(a).
Hawkins advances a number of additional arguments in an attempt to show error in the
denial of his Rule 35(a) motion. Specifically, he argues he is entitled to Rule 35(a) relief because
the state violated his statutory right to a speedy trial, because his conviction was the result of
judicial and prosecutorial misconduct, and because his counsel rendered ineffective assistance
during the course of the competency proceedings.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.10-14.) As with

Hawkins’ other claims, these claims are nothing more than attacks on Hawkins’ underlying
conviction, and are therefore not within the scope of a Rule 35 motion. Again, it is well
established that Rule 35 does not provide a mechanism to challenge the underlying conviction
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under the guise of a claim that the sentence is illegal. State v. Warren, 135 Idaho 836, 841-42, 25
P.3d 859, 864-65 (Ct. App. 2001). Because Hawkins’ speedy trial, judicial misconduct,
prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel claims challenge the propriety of
his conviction, not the legality of his sentence, the claims do not fall within the scope of I.C.R. 35
and were properly rejected by the district court.
Hawkins has failed to show any basis for reversal of the district court’s order denying his
Rule 35 motion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order denying
Hawkins’ Rule 35 motion for correction of an illegal sentence.
DATED this 9th day of November, 2017.

_/s/ Lori A. Fleming______________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 9th day of November, 2017, served two true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the United States mail,
postage prepaid, addressed to:
FARON RAYMOND HAWKINS
IDOC #17833
ISCI UNIT 9
P. O. BOX 14
BOISE, ID 83707
_/s/ Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
LAF/dd
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